This paper presents results of empirical study of passwords really used on internet. These passwords were obtained during two data acquisitions in three years period. In this paper a method for the evaluation of password security against a dictionary attack and a brute force attack is suggested and used for security evaluation of these passwords. The method is based on a mathematical model and a simulation of dictionary attack and a brute force attack. In the paper trends of password selecting are identified and expected progress is outlined. Simultaneously truly used passwords are investigated by statistic methods.
INTRODUCTION
Data security is an actual issue that is being discussed, especially in the public administration domain for the value of information [8] . One of mechanisms used in achieving one's security goals is authentication based on some knowledge shared by the system and the user, a password [11] . Nowadays passwords are still commonly used for authentication purposes, although recently they are thought as not being secure as some of other forms of authentication mechanisms [9] . The reason behind this is probably because the implementing of passwords is easy and not so expensive [4] . There are many client/server applications that use passwords for authentication, for remotely logging onto a supplier's web database and/or bank systems. In these applications it is often possible for an attacker to intercept the password and then replay it to the server. This replay problem can be overcome by using a system called Onetime -Password System (OTP) [3] , [10] . An OTP system has an advantage over a regular password system in that the former generates a different password for each time authentication is required. In the one-timepassword system, the password entered by the user does not traverse the network. This enables the OTP systems to protect users against passive attacks [6] , [10] .
In this contribution the authors do not use the OTP way, they are more interested in the accuracy of old password systems and can prove that they still function effectively.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Due to the fact that impostors are always looking for new ways on how to get access to protected accounts, many factors that influence password authentication security exist. Examples of these factors are: length of the password, encrypting methods, the mode in how the password is stored, and so on. As it is depicted in Figure 1 , it is possible to divide these factors into two basic groups, human factors and technological factors.
Human factors can be divided to two categories: -Type of password (length, randomness, used characters, etc.) -Mode the user guards a password (how often a user change his password, whether the user writes a password down, and so on) Since users are thought to be the weakest link of every security solution, it is necessary to study their behavior. We are convinced of the need to study how users choose their passwords, because it evidently infers of security of this kind of authentication.
A lot of authors frequently discuss about the factors that influence password security, for example: length, randomness, and the period the password is used. Some authors are trying to make a distinction between a "weak" and a "strong" password, commonly by using an expert's opinion [1] . Other authors are trying to break passwords, and the results of their experiments are present as a proof of the passwords weakness [7] , [2] . The authors of this paper are convinced about the need for an exact number that represents the security level of some password. The characteristic of password security will serve for various purposes: -Decisions on how password authentication will be implemented (password security evaluation as a part of risk analysis). -Surveys on long-time term trends in password selection.
-Surveys in password selection by different types of users.
-Studies on the effect of different modes of trainings in password selection. The goal of our research is to find whether habits of passwords selecting of internet users are changing. For this reason method of passwords security evaluation against brute force and dictionary attacks is suggested, this method is validated and used for evaluation of passwords gathered on internet in three years period.
METHOD SUGGESTION 3.1. General Principle
Let us determine the security of some password as being S(p), where p is a password selected from the set of all possible passwords P, i.e. p ∈ P. Theoretically, the set P is a non-bounded set (it is always possible to select a longer password), but in practice every system has a maximum capacity. Next, it is possible to give reasons for S(p)∈〈0,∞). The value zero represents the situation where the impostor knows the password and does not need to break the password. The right boundary of this interval results from the fact that it is always possible to construct a more secure password (again we assume the system has an unlimited capacity).
The concrete value of S(p) should represent the effort an attacker must invest when attempting to break a password. When the value of this indicator is high, it means that the impostor is experiencing higher expenses while trying to break a password. Intuitively two criterions emerge:
-Time to crack a password -Cost of cracking a password The time needed for cracking a password depends on technological factors. This time will differ depending on whether an attack is carried out via the internet or via a local network. The fact that in some systems an account is obstructed for a period of time after an unsuccessful attack, can impact the time needed to crack a password. The cost of password cracking is also closely related to technological factors. As previously discussed, the goal of this paper is to create a method based on human factors with elimination of technological factors. Next, these two factors can change as a result of new progresses in technology.
For these reasons, as criterion of an attacker's effort, the expected value of the number of attempts an attacker has to carry out to break the password is selected. The advantage of this criterion is non-dependence on technology factors. Time and cost criteria, which were previously discussed, can derive from this genuine criterion if needed. For example, it is not difficult to determine how many attempts you are required to make per hour in order to successfully crack a password, at a network level.
The evaluation of passwords from a security point of view is composed of two phases: 1. Attack simulation model 2. Password security evaluation, on the base of attack simulation model
Attack Simulation Model
When constructing a model of dictionary attack and a brute force attack we formulate two assumptions: 1. Attackers are choosing the most effective way of attack. 2. Attackers know the types of passwords users are selecting.
The first assumption results from the principle of rational behavior of every individual. The second results from our opinion that an attacker can get information about user habits either from an expert's opinion and/or from a study. It is reasonable to assume that Czech users will most likely select a Czech word as their password than a Spanish word. Next, a lot of research exists that describe which types of passwords users select (e.g. length of typical password, its structure, and so on). Moreover, this paper can also be used as a reference guide for attackers as well.
For simplicity but without loosing accuracy, we can think a brute force attack is like a special kind of a dictionary attack. For example, when an attacker is trying to know whether a password is two characters long, he is actually testing whether a password is a word from the virtual dictionary that consists of all twocharacter words. The size of this virtual dictionary can be calculated by eq. (1).
The size of a virtual dictionary. NPC The number of possible characters. L
The length of a password. Now we can consider a dictionary attack and a brute force attack to be a wellconsidered sequence of tests performed when trying to know whether a password is a word from a given dictionary. The question is "What dictionary does an attacker use?" on the first attempt, the second, and so on. Based on the assumptions previously discussed, the attacker prefers dictionaries that maximize the probability of his success and minimize the number of attempts to break the password. This criterion can by expressed by eq. (2).
(2)
Where:
SDA(d) Success rate of the dictionary attack on dictionary d. NBP d The number of passwords that would be broken by dictionary d. N d The size of dictionary d. NP
Total number of tested passwords used in the attack simulation. Because we expect the attacker will not test words he has already tested, when sorting dictionaries we recursively remove the used words and reassess unused dictionaries. The overall process is described by the following algorithm.
Step 1: Gather passwords that were used in a given environment by a given kind of users. Step 2: Gather all possible dictionaries that can contain passwords gathered in step 1. These dictionaries will be used for dictionary attack simulations.
Step 3: Create virtual dictionaries that consists of all one-character strings, two-character strings, and so on, and that can contain passwords gathered in step 1. The sizes of these dictionaries N VD can be calculated by Eq. 1. These dictionaries will be used for brute force attack simulations.
Step 4: Calculate the success rate of the dictionary attack for every dictionary SDA(d), using Eq. 2.
Step 5: If the success rate of the dictionary attack SDA(d) for every dictionary is zero, stop this algorithm, otherwise continue.
Step 6: Select dictionary with maximum attack success rate. This dictionary will be used in the attack simulation model in the order this dictionary was selected.
Step 7: Delete all the words that the selected dictionary contains from the remaining dictionaries. A new set is created for the remaining reduced dictionaries.
Step 8: Repeat step 4 for the set of remaining reduced dictionaries.
Password Security Evaluation
The result of this algorithm is a sorted set of reduced dictionaries that the attacker can use in the event he wants to break a password in the most effective way. Now, it is easy to calculate the security of a password, which is defined as the expected value of number of attempts the impostor has to carry out to break a password, with help of Eq. 3.
(3)
S( p i ) Security of a password p that is a word from i-th reduced dictionary. i
The order of the reduced dictionary that contains a password p. N i
The size of the i-th reduced dictionary. When calculating S(p i ) a desire to express a variability of this variable can arise, due to the fact that dictionaries can have different sizes. We suggest, as the parameter of this variability, the range of security of a password that can be calculated by Eq. 4.
(4)
RS( p i ) Range of security of password p that is a word from i-th reduced dictionary.
N i
The size of the i-th reduced dictionary. On the base of Eq. 4, one can say that the best model is a model that consists of ordered sequences of one-word reduced dictionaries. Unfortunately this model loses the ability of generalization because it does not take into account the passwords that did not appear in previous surveys. 
PASSWORDS SURVEY
In our study of real used passwords we gathered two sets of passwords users used on web pages. The first collection was used as training data for model parameters training and the second one was used as test data for model evaluation. The first set of 2,958 passwords was collected during 2005 [5] . All users who were selecting passwords were Czech speaking, and the requirements for password selection are as follows:
-The password has to contain a minimum of one character.
-Maximum length of the password is not restricted. -Users had no time limit when selecting a password.
-A password could contain arbitrary characters typed using a keyboard. The second set of passwords was collected three years after the first study (in 2008), and 1,895 passwords were collected. The requirements for password selection were the same as in the first study.
Firstly, Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) was applied to the first password collection. The goal of this analysis was to create the basic assumptions about users' behavior, and for pertinent dictionaries selection. Diacritic characters were rarely used in passwords, only in 1.8% passwords. Further, only 10.6% of passwords contained an uppercase character and 23.2% of passwords contained a minimum of one numeral. After dividing the acquired passwords into four groups, in relation to the "randomness" of the password, it is possible to see that users prefer common words as their passwords, as you can see in Fig. 2 . This assumption is proven when you test the correlation coefficients hypothesis between the frequencies of characters in passwords and the frequencies of characters in Czech words (Kendall rank correlation coefficient equals 0.78).
The fact users use a very often common words as their passwords is proven by statistical test of correlation between frequency of characters in Czech texts and in gathered passwords (see table 1 ).
The value of Kendal Tau correlation coefficient is 0.78 (see table 2 ). Not only the structure but also the length of passwords from the first collection was investigated. Figure 3 depicts the frequency of the length of a password.
When creating an attack model we selected, with help of the first data set, in accordance with the algorithm described before, 21 dictionaries from 35 original directories we acquired from different resources. The final order of these reduced dictionaries is as follows: Frequency in passwords 0,062 0,070 0,026 0,001 0,065 0,044 0,047 0,028 0,020 0,007 0,005 0,006 0,008 Figure 4 shows the dependence of the False acceptance ratio on the number of tested passwords in the dictionary attack as well for the data set gathered in 2005 and data set gathered in 2008. Generally, the False acceptance ratio is a conditional probability that an impostor will be labeled by an authentication system as a valid user. This dependency in our model is expressed by Eq. 5. The results of the modeled brute force attack, that follow-up to dictionary attack, are not depicted for lack of space.
Where: FAR False acceptance ratio. NA
The number of attempts it took to break a password. NBP NA The number of broken passwords, after some number of attempts to break a password. NP Total number of tested passwords used in the attack simulation. From figure 4 it is possible to see that in 2008 users were choosing more secure passwords than in 2008. Table 3 shows results of our study. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between the expected frequency of passwords, gained from the first data set, and the actual frequency of passwords, gained from the second data set, equals 0.94. The high value of this coefficient indicates the stability of this model. Now we can make the conclusion that 10.85% of all passwords have S( p 1 ) = 246 (with RS( p 1 ) = 489), and so on.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a model for dictionary attack and brute force attack is developed. On the base of this model the security of passwords can be evaluated from a user's perspective. The proposed model has an important variable that must be set, the ordered set of reduced dictionaries (no dictionary contains a word another dictionary has). For accuracy of the model, it is necessary to carefully select and sort these dictionaries. In our study we used an empirical approach, but an expert's estimates can be involved as well.
If an entity doesn't have the resources to set the ordered set of reduced dictionaries carefully, we recommend that the entity consider the calculated value for the security of password S( p i ) as the maximum expected value because an impostor is more likely to create a more effective ordered set of reduced dictionaries.
We are confident that this variable differs for different types of conditions. Some users can prefer different types of passwords, and moreover they can prefer different passwords to different systems. In our study we investigated the same information system and likely the same kind of users, but the results are not exactly the same. Of course, the first source of this disparity is randomness (selected password can be though as being a random variable), but it is probable that there can be other sources, perhaps a rising awareness in security. Our method evaluates the security of passwords only from a dictionary attack and a brute force attack point of view. Indeed other aspects have to be considering, for example whether users write down their passwords. The next aspects are technology factors that are not considered in this paper. Although only selected factors are considered in our method we are confident about its usefulness because it can serve as a means for future password studies.
